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Abstract
This paper examines the PROGRESA and PROCAMPO cash transfer programs in
Mexico and evaluates their impact on household food security and nutrition. These
two programs diﬀer in their targeting and design: PROGRESA is aimed at women and
program conditionality is linked to current consumption and human capital investment;
PROCAMPO beneﬁts male farmers and program conditionality is linked to agricultural
production. The main question addressed by the paper is whether a cash transfer program
geared to agricultural production can have the same impact on food security as a cash
transfer program geared to consumption through purchases. Our results suggest that
monetary payments linked to a productive asset –land– can have as large or larger impact
on food security as cash transfers not linked to a productive asset. We show that both
programs boost total food consumption and caloric intake in similar proportions. However,
increased food security is achieved through diﬀerent channels – for PROGRESA through
purchases while for PROCAMPO through investment in home production. This suggests
that the choice of program design depends on objectives beyond total food consumption
and caloric intake, such as consumption from speciﬁc food categories, diversity of food
consumption, investment in agricultural production, and the degree of access to retail
food markets.
Keywords: Cash Transfer Programs, PROGRESA, PROCAMPO, Food Security
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Resumo
Este artigo analisa o PROGRESA e o PROCAMPO, dois programas de transferˆ encia de
renda no M´ exico e avalia o impacto deles em termos de seguran¸ ca alimentar e nutri¸ c˜ ao. Os
dois programas diferem na focaliza¸ c˜ ao e no desenho: o PROGRESA beneﬁcia as mulheres
e a condicionalidade do programa est´ a relacionada ao consumo atual e ao investimento
em capital humano, o PROCAMPO beneﬁcia os agricultores do sexo masculino e a
condicionalidade est´ a relacionada ` a produ¸ c˜ ao agr´ ıcola. A quest˜ ao principal considerada no
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artigo ´ e se um programa centrado na produ¸ c˜ ao agr´ ıcola pode obter o mesmo impacto sobre
a seguran¸ ca alimentar que um programa centrado no consumo por meio de compras. Os
nossos resultados sugerem que pagamentos monet´ arios relacionados a um ativo produtivo
–a terra– podem ter um impacto t˜ ao grande ou maior sobre a seguran¸ ca alimentar do que
um programa de transferˆ encia de renda n˜ ao relacionado a um ativo produtivo. O artigo
mostra que ambos os programas fortalecem o consumo alimentar e a ingest˜ ao cal´ orica
nas mesmas propor¸ c˜ oes. Por´ em o aumento da seguran¸ ca alimentar se atinge por canais
diversos – por compra de comida no PROGRESA e por aumento de investimento da
produ¸ c˜ ao caseira no PROCAMPO. Isso sugere que a escolha de desenho do programa
depende de outros objetivos al´ em do consumo alimentar e da ingest˜ ao cal´ orica, tais como
consumo de certas categorias de alimentos, diversidade da dieta, investimento na produ¸ c˜ ao
agr´ ıcola e o grau de acesso aos mercados de alimentos por atacado.
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1. Introduction
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact on food security of
two cash transfer programs in rural Mexico. Monetary transfer programs are
still rare in developing countries, but in Latin America they are increasingly
replacing traditional policy instruments for alleviating poverty, food insecurity,
and for promoting rural development. In-kind social programs such as school meals
and feeding programs for pregnant-lactating women, and other food assistance
interventions such as food stamps, input subsidies, livestock protection, price
supports, and exchange rate controls have been widely used in developing countries
to provide increased resources for low-income households. However, some studies
of food subsidization ﬁnd these to be ineﬃcient in helping the poor improve
their nutritional status, and argue that most of the subsidization policies end up
beneﬁting the richest households (Gray (1982); Alderman and Von Braun (1984)).
Other studies favor targeted food programs instead of general food subsidies in
order to promote eﬀective redistribution of income to the poor (Pinstrup-Andersen
1993). In addition, growing evidence, as well as economic eﬃciency arguments
suggest that a simple income transfer system can provide similar opportunities
for the poor to attain nutritionally adequate diets and self-suﬃciency with less
administrative complexity and less distortions in the economy (Case and Deaton
(1998); Sahn and Gerstle (2001)).
PROGRESA and PROCAMPO are interesting examples of social protection
interventions. First, they are cash transfer programs, which are still unusual in
developing countries around the world, and they represent a large fraction of
average total household income. Thus they provide an exceptional opportunity to
examine the impact of giving people relatively large sums of money. Second, they
are conditional cash transfers, representing a shift in how rural policy is carried
out in Latin America. Conditional cash transfers are targeted interventions that
stress beneﬁciary ‘co-responsibility’ and require speciﬁc behavior by the recipients.
The two cash transfer programs we examine diﬀer in their gender targeting, with
PROGRESA aimed at women and PROCAMPO at producers who are usually men,
and program conditionality, with PROGRESA linked to consumption and human
capital investment and PROCAMPO linked to agricultural production. Third, they
represent two distinct forms of cash transfers that have been implemented in rural
areas of a single country: Mexico.
The main questions addressed in this paper are as follows:
⋆ Financial assistance was provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
IMF or FAO.
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(i) Does program structure (targeting and conditionality) in the provision of cash
transfers matter in terms of food security outcomes?
(ii) Can a cash transfer program geared towards production (PROCAMPO) have
the same impact on food security as an anti-poverty cash transfer program
geared towards consumption (PROGRESA)?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes PROCAMPO and
PROGRESA, Section 3 presents the main research hypothesis, Section 4 describes
data sources and econometric approach. Results are presented in Section 5.
Conclusions and policy recommendations are provided in Section 6.
2. Cash Transfers in Mexico: PROCAMPO and PROGRESA
2.1. PROCAMPO
PROCAMPO was implemented in Mexico in the Winter 1994 agricultural season,
following the commencement of NAFTA. The program was designed as a 15-year
transition to free trade and is expected to terminate in 2008. Eligibility, and
therefore the maximum level of PROCAMPO transfer payments, vary across
households and are based on household behavior during the pre-PROCAMPO
period. PROCAMPO provides eligible agricultural producers with a ﬁxed payment
per hectare. This payment is decoupled from current land use and is the same
across the whole country. The level of eligibility is dependent on the total hectares
of nine key crops (corn, beans, rice, wheat, sorghum, barley, soybeans, cotton and
cardamom) that were planted in the three agricultural years prior to and including
August 1993. Eligibility was actually given to land parcels and those with usufruct
over these land parcels, not particular farmers, and payment should go to whomever
is planting the property, whether owner, renter or sharecropper. The eligibility
roster was ﬁxed prior to commencement of the program; no new properties have
been added since 1994.
Since there are potentially two agricultural seasons per year, PROCAMPO
payments may be made up to twice a year, though in general only farmers with
access to irrigation can take advantage of the second agricultural season. Payments
correspond to the amount of land currently under production, which cannot exceed
the amount of land registered in the eligibility roster.1
Farmers must prove that the parcel is currently under production, but monitoring
of actual planting is haphazard, and many devices are employed to skirt this
requirement. However, given that the program is based on past agricultural
production and the requirement that farmers continue producing or participate
in an oﬃcial environmental management program, the intervention is closely and
intentionally linked to agricultural production.
1 Fallow land does not merit payment.
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Each season after planting, farmers must go to one of the 700 CADER (Center
for the Assistance of Rural Development) oﬃces around the country with proof of
planting to solicit their payment. Payments are in the form of checks distributed
at the CADER oﬃces and, in 1997, averaged US$329 per recipient and US$68
per hectare. An additional beneﬁt to farmers of participating in the program is
that PROCAMPO qualiﬁcation certiﬁcates can be used as collateral for borrowing
from commercial banks and input retailers, although often at very high interest
rates. PROCAMPO covers 95 percent of the cultivated area in Mexico that
had been planted in corn, beans, sorghum and wheat. It covers on average 14
million hectares of land each year, reaching almost three million producers and
providing payments in 1998 of US$919 million (Sagar 1998). PROCAMPO is
particularly important in the ejido (land reform) sector where 84 percent of
ejiditarios participated in PROCAMPO and received payments for, on average,
5.2 hectares. Since PROCAMPO is distributed on a per hectare basis, larger farms
have tended to get higher total transfers; for example, households with less than
5 hectares make up 45 percent of recipients but receive only 10 percent of total
transfer payments (Sagar 1998). However, since PROCAMPO provides a uniform
payment per hectare regardless of yield or crop sales, it tends to over compensates
smallholders who may have had limited yields and reaches households who did not
beneﬁt from pre-NAFTA price supports because they had no marketed surplus
(Martinez 1999).
2.2. PROGRESA
PROGRESA was initiated in Mexico in 1997 as a mechanism for addressing
extreme poverty in rural areas. Although a cash transfer program, a primary
thrust of PROGRESA is to develop the human capital of poor households by
improving education, health and nutrition outcomes. Households are required to
visit health care clinics and send their children to school in order to maintain
eligibility. Transfers are provided directly to mothers under the assumption they
are more likely to use funds in a manner that will be beneﬁcial to the development
of their children. The gender targeting of the program is one of many mechanisms
geared towards improving health and education outcomes.
Because PROGRESA targets poor households, criteria were developed for
determining eligibility based on household well-being. This selection of eligible
households was done in three stages (see Skouﬁas et al. (1999). First, potential
recipient communities were identiﬁed as poor communities based on an index
of marginality developed from the national population census. This marginality
index was constructed using community data including the share of illiterate
adults, access to water, drainage and electricity, number of occupants per room,
dwellings with a dirt ﬂoor and population working in the primary sector.
After communities were identiﬁed, the second step was to select households for
participation in PROGRESA based on data collected from a household census
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within the community. A proxy means test was calculated for each household
using discriminant analysis and households above the cut-oﬀ point were selected
as beneﬁciaries.
By the end of 1999, PROGRESA provided bimonthly transfers to approximately
2.6 million households or about 40 percent of all rural families and 11 percent of all
Mexican families. The program operated in almost 50,000 communities, and had a
budget of US$777 million or nearly 20 percent of the Mexican governments budget
allocation for poverty alleviation. Average payments to beneﬁciary households in
1997 were substantial, representing 29 percent of average per capita income of
beneﬁciaries. Because PROGRESA links payment of transfers to school attendance
and visits to health care facilities, it was expected and has been shown that the
program had a signiﬁcant impact on education attendance and health outcomes.
Note that households receiving PROGRESA are not permitted to receive
other forms of anti-poverty or education subsidies, but this does not apply to
PROCAMPO beneﬁts. Thus PROGRESA and PROCAMPO transfers are provided
to eligible rural households at the same time. A signiﬁcant number of households
are eligible to receive transfers from both sources.
3. Hypothesis
In this section we present some hypotheses about why we might expect
PROCAMPO and PROGRESA cash transfers to lead to diﬀerent outcomes in
terms of food security. There are at least four reasons why we might expect that
income from these two programs is used diﬀerently by the recipient household.
Though we are not always able to disentangle the role of each hypothesis, and do
not aim at evaluating them separately, each one holds ceteris paribus, and may
have an eﬀect on the diﬀerent outcome of the two programs.
3.1. Gender
One of the most important diﬀerences between the two programs is that over
90 percent of PROCAMPO beneﬁciaries are men while PROGRESA is directly
targeted to women. 2 The reasons for this targeting strategy stems from the
increasing evidence in the development literature that females spend income
diﬀerently than men. In particular, women are more likely to spend own-earned
income on nutrition and children’s health and education while men are more likely
to divert income towards wasteful consumption, such as tobacco, and alcohol.
For instance, Duﬂo (2003) ﬁnds that pensions received by women in South Africa
had a large impact on the anthropometrical status of girls; in contrast no eﬀect on
the nutrition status of household children is found for pensions received by men.
2 Males may be PROGRESA beneﬁciaries when no adult female is available. This occurs in
approximately 1 percent of the households in this sample.
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Thomas (1990) for Brazil shows that more income under the control of women leads
to greater health and nutrition related expenditures. On the other hand, Hoddinott
et al. (1995) report that in Cote d’Ivore expenditure on alcohol and tobacco are
positively related to the share of income that goes to men. In addition, these
gender diﬀerences in the allocation of income seem to be especially relevant among
poor households (Kennedy and Peters 1992), such as those in our sample. Similar
conclusions are drawn when the allocation of resources by female and male-headed
households is examined (Handa (1994); Kennedy and Peters (1992)).
Since the allocation of transfer income depends on the gender of the transfer
recipient, we expect PROGRESA and PROCAMPO transfer payments to have
a diﬀerent impact on food security. Based on the literature summarized above,
the initial hypothesis is that PROGRESA will lead to a larger increase in food
expenditure and caloric intake because it is directed to women.
3.2. Investment
Another key diﬀerence between PROGRESA and PROCAMPO is that the latter
is linked to the use of a productive asset, land, while PROGRESA – in the short
run on which our analysis focus – is not. By linking transfers to productive assets,
multiplier eﬀects out of productive investment are expected. This is likely to be
important if the household is credit constrained, as it is generally the case in
poor, rural Mexico. Another diﬀerence is that PROCAMPO payments can be used
as collateral against which to borrow money. If PROCAMPO transfers actually
relax the household credit constraints, this can potentially create further multiplier
eﬀects. Other studies of PROCAMPO have indeed found these multiplier eﬀects
(Sadoulet et al. 2001). Thus, beneﬁts to future income and consumption of these
multiplicative eﬀects can be substantial.
Hence, our initial hypothesis is that PROCAMPO will have a greater impact
on food security through agricultural investment, while the impact of PROGRESA
through agricultural investment will be limited given the consumption-based nature
of the program. If producers invest transfers and spend proﬁts, PROCAMPO might
not have a large initial impact on consumption but a large medium or long term
impact on consumption. Our period of analysis –1998– is the 4th year of the
PROCAMPO program so we are probably able to capture some of these longer
term impacts on consumption if they exist.
The investment eﬀect of PROGRESA and PROCAMPO on food security can
be stated in terms of a short run-long run trade oﬀ, as well as in terms of a
productive-human capital investment tradeoﬀ. If PROCAMPO beneﬁciaries invest
transfers, PROCAMPO is likely to have a limited short-run impact on food security
outcomes, but a larger long-run impact. In contrast, PROGRESA is likely to have
a bigger immediate eﬀect on food and calorie consumption. PROGRESA also has
a long-run dimension, which comes from the build up of human capital. The
long run in this case is generational, and an evaluation of the long-run impact
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of PROGRESA is beyond the scope of this paper. Given the period of analysis
and the dates when the two programs started, our hypothesis is that the observed
impact of PROCAMPO will be larger than the observed impact of PROGRESA on
food security because the PROCAMPO eﬀect includes the multiplier eﬀect from
long-run productive investment which is the focus of that program.
3.3. Quantity versus quality
There is a debate in the development literature on the extent to which nutrition
responds to income. One view is that economic growth and rising per capita income
will lead to better nutrition and eventually eliminate malnutrition among the
poorest. Subramanian and Deaton (1996) ﬁnd calorie elasticities around 0.3-0.5
which partially support this view; Strauss (1986) ﬁnds an estimate as high as 0.9
for rural Sierre Leone which would imply that cash transfer policies might be highly
eﬀective at reducing malnutrition. However some authors have questioned these
ﬁndings and conclusions. Berhman and Wolfe (1984)), Berhman and Deolalikar
(1987) and Bouis and Haddad (1992) ﬁnd that the calorie elasticity with respect to
income is close to zero, even in populations with considerable malnutrition, so that
increases in income would not result in substantial improvements in nutritional
intakes. Similarly, Butler et al. (1985), using data from the Food Stamp Cashout
Project, ﬁnd no signiﬁcant increase in nutrient intake as income increases.
For policy purposes both the total impact of a program and the mechanism
through which that impact is achieved are important. There are two mechanisms
through which rural poor households in Mexico can reduce their food insecurity:
purchases and home production. Households can either use the cash payments
to acquire calories from the market, or can invest them in their land to increase
home production and consumption. If PROCAMPO requires that farmers continue
to use their agricultural land for crops or livestock it is more likely that the
payments are invested in the land or in the creation of household assets, which
would stimulate home food production and consumption. If no such requirement
exists for PROGRESA payments, and if the platicas provide better access to the
market through information, we can expect PROGRESA beneﬁciaries to increase
their food security through purchases.
4. The Empirical Approach
4.1. Data
The data used for the analysis were collected as part of the PROGRESA
evaluation. In the second wave of expansion of the program (late 1997) 505
communities were selected to participate in the evaluation, and one-third of these
were randomly selected for delayed entry into the program in order to serve as the
control group for the social experiment. In both treatment and control communities,
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households were divided in eligible and not, through a proxy means test of poverty.
Initially, the 52 percent most poor were considered eligible. In a second phase, the
eligible group was expanded to cover about 78 percent of households, through a
process knows as densiﬁcation, which led to the inclusion of poor families with older
members and no children. As the latter group started receiving transfers later, and
has diﬀerent characteristics, we limit our analysis to the households initially deﬁned
as poor and eligible. Densiﬁcados and non-poor households are excluded from our
sample.
The data we use are the baseline survey (ENCASEH) which was conducted in
late 1997 among all communities to be incorporated in the second wave of expansion
to determine household program eligibility, and the post-treatment survey on the
evaluation sample of households conducted in October 1998 (ENCEL98O). By
this time, beneﬁciaries had been receiving transfers from PROGRESA for about
seven months (as payments began in April 1998) and from PROCAMPO for
about four years. 3 While the objective of the evaluation was to measure the
impact of Progresa, the survey also collected information on whether the household
participated in PROCAMPO, and the amount of transfer income received from
that program. Hence we have a unique data set of poor rural households with
a signiﬁcant participation in these two important cash transfer programs. Our
sample of households can be divided into four groups: PROGRESA recipients
only (44.2 percent), PROCAMPO recipients only (9.4 percent), PROGRESA and
PROCAMPO recipients (19.1 percent of all households), and non-recipients (27.3
percent). The number of observations in each group is reported at the top of Table
1. Households in groups 2 and 4 are eligible for Progresa but are located in the
control communities. Overall, 63.3 percent of the sample receives PROGRESA, 28.5
percent receive PROCAMPO and 72.7 percent participate in at least one program.
4.2. Empirical speciﬁcations
Our objective is to analyze the eﬀect of PROGRESA and PROCAMPO transfers
on a set of food security indicators which include food consumption in monetary
terms, caloric availability and food diversity. In addition we seek to understand
the mechanism through which households achieve food security and so speciﬁcally
explore whether program participation leads to more home production or cash
purchases. These measures are a function of transfer income, non-transfer income,
prices, and preferences. Since our focus lies on comparing the eﬀects of PROGRESA
and PROCAMPO and not the direct eﬀect of earned income on food security, and
since earned income is endogenous, we include an exhaustive set of exogenous
3 Following the October 1998 survey two additional ENCEL surveys were conducted in March and
October 1999. Results from the evaluation of PROGRESA show that the main impact of Progresa in
terms of schooling, health, and consumption is found after the initial 6 months of the program (October
1998). After that, the impact does not get bigger, and in fact in some cases, is reduced. In addition,
PROCAMPO households in ENCEL October 1998 have been in that program for 4 years and so we
assume that the long term beneﬁts (multiplier eﬀect) of PROCAMPO are fully realized by this time.
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variables that we expect would explain variations in earned income among
households. These variables include measures of human capital and household
assets as well as regional dummies which control for regional diﬀerences in the
ability to generate income that are that are linked to infrastructure, public services,
etc. A number of these variables, particularly age and gender of the head of
household, whether the household is indigenous, and education levels, may also
reﬂect diﬀerences in preferences across households. However, distinguishing the
eﬀects of earned income and preferences on food consumption and caloric intake
is not the main concern of this study – it is suﬃcient for our objective that we
control for variations in these factors across models in order to isolate the net
impact of program transfers on food security. Note that the control variables come
from the 1997 baseline survey while the expenditure and transfer data come from
ENCEL98O.
4.2.1. Food consumption
We estimate the following linear form of the Engel curve for food expenditure:
Berhman and Deolalikar (1987, 1989) present estimates for a poor Indian
population that indicate that, although income elasticities of food expenditure are
large, income elasticities of calorie intakes are much smaller. This ﬁnding suggests
that individual weigh food attributes other than calorie content when they make
their food choices in response to income changes. That is, people substitute quality
or diversity for quantity as income rises. The income elasticity of the average
price paid per calorie has been used as a proxy for food quality. Estimates of this
elasticity have been found to be positive and not trivially small even for very poor
households (Gray (1982); Berhman and Deolalikar (1987)). Thus, if non-nutritive
food characteristics – taste, appearance, status, and degree of processing – are
favored highly at the margin, then income increases will not alleviate malnutrition
nearly as much as the World-Bank (1986) and others have claimed.
To understand the various ways households respond to increased income we study
whether PROGRESA and PROCAMPO cash transfers increase diversity in the
composition of the food basket, and in particular, whether increased income leads
to the purchase of more vegetables and meat, or to the purchase of more expensive
but less nutritive products such as processed foods. Our initial hypothesis is that
PROGRESA will increase diversity through program information and a higher
propensity to purchase calories, while PROCAMPO might not increase diversity
since calories are more likely to be obtained through home production. PROGRESA
beneﬁciaries are required to attend lectures, platicas, where information and
training on education and nutrition are given by a doctor or a nurse from the health
clinic serving the community. It is widely recognized that poor nutritional status
can be caused not only by insuﬃcient intake of calories, but also by a diet that is
insuﬃciently diverse. The information and training given at the platicas might lead
recipients to increase their vegetable and meat intake thus improving their overall
diet and ultimately nutritional status. Since PROGRESA recipients are more likely
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to obtain calories through purchases and market oﬀers a wider range of food
products than home production, this might also increase the likelihood of eating
a more varied diet. Of course access to and reliance on the market might increase
diversity in an undesirable fashion through increased purchases of non-nutritious
items such as cookies and soft drinks. In contrast, PROCAMPO money is more
likely to be invested in home production which consists predominantly of grains
and cereals – the basis of the diet in rural Mexico.
4.3. Mechanisms for achieving household food security
Fi = β0 + β1PROGRESAi + β2PROCAMPOi + β3Xi + ǫi (1)
where Fi is monthly per capita 4 food consumption of household i, and
PROCAMPOi are monthly per capita payments from the two transfer programs,
Xi is a vector of socio-economic characteristics of household i, including regional
dummies, and a price index, and εi is the error term. All consumption measures
and transfer values discussed in this paper refer to October 1998 and are expressed
in constant (1997) pesos.
An interaction term between the two program transfers was initially added to
the speciﬁcation but not found to be signiﬁcant. While both double log and linear
functional forms are found in the literature, we opt for the linear one because we
are directly interested in marginal propensities to consume out of diﬀerent sources
of income. Case and Deaton (1998) and Duﬂo (2003) use linear models to compare
transfer and non-transfer income, and linear models are the norm in the food stamps
literature where the objective is to compare the marginal propensity to consume
out of diﬀerent sources of income (food stamps and cash).
As explained in the previous section, both consumption and the transfers
from PROCAMPO and PROGRESA refer to October 1998. The estimate of the
coeﬃcient β1 will give the short term marginal expenditure out of every additional
peso paid by PROGRESA, and β2 the medium-term (after about four years)
marginal expenditure out of every additional peso paid by PROCAMPO 5 (as
in Sadoulet et al. (2001)). All other regressors refer to 1997, in order to avoid
endogeneity, and proxy household income and preferences. 6
4 All per capita measures in the paper (consumption expenditure, calories consumed and transfers) are
adjusted per adult-male equivalent. Household size in adult-male equivalent persons is actual household
size adjusted for the age and sex of the household members. The adjustment procedure weights each
household member by the nutritional requirements of an adult male age 23-50. This measure of household
size is further adjusted to account for household members not eating at home, and guests.
5 PROCAMPO transfers are not constant across time, as households can rent and buy land entitled to
program beneﬁts. Furtheremore, households can decide not to grow crops in a given year or discontinue
authorized environmental programs, interrupting this way the ﬂow of payments.
6 One exception is made for land. In fact, in the Encaseh 1997 survey, all land plots below one hectare
of size were recorded as measuring one hectare. This greatly reduces variability, as most plots have
small size. More precise information is in this case drawn from the Encel survey of October 1998. As
will be explained in the section on identiﬁcation, land and PROCAMPO transfers will not convey the
same information, as not all land plots are entitled to the program, and suﬃcient variability across land
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To determine if the impact of a PROGRESA peso is diﬀerent from a
PROCAMPO peso we test whether Ho : β1 = β2. A failure to reject this hypothesis
would imply that the marginal propensity to consume food out of PROCAMPO is
the same as the marginal propensity to consume food out of PROGRESA. However,
this does not necessarily imply that the conditions and eligibility requirements
in the provision of cash transfers do not matter. The mechanism through which
increased consumption is achieved, which is determined by program conditionality
and the gender of the recipient, is still important. Failure to reject the null
hypothesis may occur even when the programs have very diﬀerent behavioral
impacts which are important for policy. On the other hand, a rejection would clearly
indicate that eligibility requirements (gender of the recipient) or/and conditionality
in the provision of cash transfer matter.
In addition to (1), we also estimate equations for 4 types of foods (fruits and
vegetables; grains and cereals; meat and other animal products; other food) to see
whether program participation aﬀects the composition of the food basket. Finally,
we repeat the entire set of estimates using budget shares instead of levels to see how
transfer income aﬀects the distribution of the budget across categories of foods.
4.3.1. Caloric availability
As noted above, foods may be purchased for many reasons aside from nutrition
convenience, pleasing tastes, appearance, taste for variety, etc. To see if transfer
income leads to increased caloric availability we estimate the following model:
Cali = β0 + β1PROGRESAi + β2PROCAMPOi + β3Xi + ǫi (2)
where Cali is number of kilocalories available per person per day in household i.
We are not only interested in whether transfer income contributes to increase the
caloric intake of these poor households, but also in whether there are shifts across
food groups, for instance from foods with high caloric content towards foods which
are more expensive but not as nutritive so we also estimate equation (2) in share
form.
4.3.2. Variety
No standard deﬁnition of measurement or optimal level of food diversity exists
in the literature, and food diversity can be quantiﬁed in a number of ways. One
possibility depends only upon whether or not any of each food is consumed, or
upon the number of commodities consumed within a broad commodity group. An
alternative approach to measuring variety is through diversity indices, which take
into account not only whether or not each food is consumed, but also the relative
magnitudes of each food consumed. We use the number of foods purchased, as well
as three diversity indices which have been widely used in economics and biology:
holding and program transfers is observed.
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ROD index =1 −
X
i
(Πi − ωi)2 (3)
where Πi is the calorie share of food i(i = 1,2,...36),ωi is the average calorie
share of good i consumed by the top decile of the distribution of per capita total
income (measured as total consumption). If only one food was consumed, the ﬁrst
two indices would be zero hence variety increases with the index value. The ROD
(Revealed Optimal Diversity) index, which is of our own invention, equals one
in the case of optimal diversity, which is assumed to be the average consumption
basket of the top decile households. Equal shares of two diﬀerent goods are weighted
equally in these indices. However one might want to weight processed foods, for
instance, diﬀerently from the rest of foods. This is based on the view that increasing
diversity towards more varied vegetables, meat and ﬁsh is better than expanding
the consumption basket towards sodas, cookies, and alcohol.
In addition to the above analysis, we estimate a series of probit regressions to
estimate the impact of each program on the probability of consuming new foods not
previously consumed. The motivation of this approach is to see whether program
participation increases the number of foods irrespective of the amount consumed
of each food. The estimated model is:
P(C(j)i) = β0 + β1PROGRESAi + β2PROCAMPOi + β3Xi + εi (4)
where P(C(j)i) is the probability of consuming food j or group j of foods by
household i and X is the usual vector of control variables.
4.3.3. Mechanisms of acquiring calories
There are two basic mechanisms of increasing caloric availability: purchases
through the market and investment in home production. The ENCEL98O survey
gives us information about how much households consume out of home production
so we are able to estimate how sensitive this type of calorie consumption is with
respect to the two cash transfer programs under analysis. The econometric strategy
used in this case is a two-step Heckman selection model because not all households
consume out of home production and this selection is not random. We believe
that what determines whether we observe this consumption or not is, among other
things, ownership of land, cattle, and agricultural machinery. The participation
or selection equation therefore includes a dummy for owning land, the number of
pieces of land owned, number of animals for agricultural work (horses, oxen, and
mules), and ownership of agricultural machinery (tractor, plumb, etc.). We estimate
equation (3) but using only calories from home production as the dependent
variable, and including the selection correction term derived from the ﬁrst stage
probit regression predicting the probability of consuming out of home production.
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4.4. Identiﬁcation of program impact
The experimental design of the sample allows a clean identiﬁcation of the
Progresa program on beneﬁciaries. Since we want to go beyond a mean treatment
eﬀect and quantify the impact of each peso received by the household, we construct
the amount of money each participant household should receive based on their
family size and children’s schooling situation. This estimator is the same as the
intent-to-treat (ITT) that is commonly used in the evaluation literature, and is
appropriate provided that program take-up is nearly universal (Bloom 1984), which
it is in the Progresa program.
Identiﬁcation of the true program impact of PROCAMPO is more challenging
since there is no randomization of participation in PROCAMPO among these
households. Speciﬁcally, there may be bias in the estimate of the PROCAMPO
impact due to the fact that households chose to participate in 1994 (selection
bias) or by the design of the program (program placement), although in general
all villages have PROCAMPO beneﬁciaries, so the latter bias would be minimal.
Moreover, since PROCAMPO eligibility is based on land use we are concerned that
the OLS estimator of PROCAMPO might be picking up the true program eﬀect
combined with a land eﬀect, and therefore be biased upwards.
In our sample around 25 percent of households that report having grown staples
(the crops required for eligibility) do not receive PROCAMPO payments. There
are also some households (5 percent) that get PROCAMPO transfers but don’t
grow staples because the program allows diﬀerent uses of land (for example
authorized environmental programs) indicating that in general there not a direct
one-to-one relationship between growing staples and participating in PROCAMPO.
Identiﬁcation of the program eﬀect would therefore come from all those households
that are similar in all relevant characteristics to PROCAMPO recipients (and in
particular, have the same type of land) but do not receive the PROCAMPO transfer
because they began growing the eligible staples after the eligibility roster was ﬁxed
or because they bought new land after 1994. If among these 25% of households there
are households that were eligible in 1994 and purposely decided not to participate,
then selectivity bias would be introduced into our parameter estimates. Previous
work on PROCAMPO (Sadoulet et al. 2001) and our own knowledge of the program
suggest that this group is likely to be very small among these poor households.
An alternative strategy to deal with the potential endogeneity of PROCAMPO
is through instrumental variables. The diﬃculty in this approach is identifying
valid instruments that adequately predict PROCAMPO transfers and that are
uncorrelated with the error term in the main regression. Three variables – the
number of mules, the number of oxen, and the non-self village mean value of
PROCAMPO transfers – pass the test for over-identifying restrictions. The validity
of these instruments is based on the maintained assumption that their impact on
the outcome variables, food expenditure for example, only occurs through the level
of PROCAMPO transfers. Based on these instruments we performed exogeneity
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tests using the method suggested by Hausman (1978) for the OLS equations and
Smith and Blundell (1986) for the probit equations (full results of this analysis is
available upon request). In most cases the hypothesis of exogeneity is not rejected
by the data, suggesting that the standard regression model is appropriate. We
present results for both the standard model and the instrumental variables model
as well as the results of the test of exogeneity in the discussion below.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 summarizes the data on per capita consumption, cash transfers,
household characteristics and regional diﬀerences that are used in the regression
analysis. The vector X is made by the following variables:
• Household demographic characteristics – household size, age and gender of the
head, ethnicity (proxied by speaking an indigenous language), composition by
gender and age (expressed in shares);
• Human capital – measured by shares of adults with diﬀerent educational degrees,
by gender;
• Material assets – proxied by the quality of the dwelling (paved or dirt ﬂoor,
access to water and electricity);
• Agricultural assets – size of land, divided in irrigated and not, pasture and
forests; number of cows and pigs;
• A community level price index;
• Geographical location – expressed by seven dummies for diﬀerent agro-climatic
areas.
In the ﬁrst column, data from the entire sample is presented while the remaining
columns report the results for the four household categories. It is expected that
PROGRESA (categories 1 and 3) and non-PROGRESA (categories 2 and 4)
households will have similar characteristics as treatment and control communities
were chosen randomly. PROCAMPO participation is not randomly assigned in
the survey so some diﬀerences between PROCAMPO (categories 2 and 3) and
non-PROCAMPO (categories 1 and 4) are expected to emerge. PROGRESA
transfers are on average between three and four times greater than PROCAMPO
transfers. For PROGRESA recipients, the transfer represents about 23 percent of
total monthly expenditure while for PROCAMPO recipients the transfer represents
less than 10 percent of total expenditure; both of these programs represent
signiﬁcant contributions to household income.
The PROCAMPO households, split into categories 2 and 3, appear to have
diﬀerent characteristics compared to categories 1 and 4. PROCAMPO households
have much larger land and livestock holdings and they participate less in
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non-agricultural wage labor. On average PROCAMPO households are larger than
non-PROCAMPO households and are further along in the life cycle, with older
household heads. All four categories have similar levels of infrastructure such as
electricity, piped water and dirt ﬂoors in their dwellings. These results indicate
that there are some diﬀerences between the PROCAMPO households and other
households while PROGRESA households seem to be similar to non-participant
households; this is not surprising given the sampling framework.
5.2. Food consumption and consumption shares
Food consumption represents the most important expenditure category, making
up around 80 percent of total household expenditure. Households report the
monetary value of food consumption and the quantities of the individual food
items used during the seven-day period preceding the interview. The price of
food is obtained by dividing the monetary value of food consumption by the
quantity of each food item used. Food not purchased directly by the household
(i.e. home-produced food) is valued at the average community price paid by the
households reporting its purchase. The total money value of food used at home is
obtained by summing the money values of the individual food items.
Table 2 reports mean values of per capita monthly consumption in pesos and
consumption shares of the main food categories for all households and the four
household types. 8 There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the unconditional means
across PROGRESA and PROCAMPO households. These households are not
comparable in terms of total wealth and other characteristics, so only some of these
diﬀerences are due to program eﬀects. The mean value of food consumption for
PROGRESA recipients is 143 pesos per person per month compared to 125 pesos
for PROCAMPO beneﬁciaries, a diﬀerence of 14 percent. It is noteworthy that
grains and cereals account for more than half of all food consumption. Recipients
of both programs are relatively similar to PROGRESA recipients. Households that
received no transfers are relatively more similar to PROCAMPO recipients.
Table 3 presents the results of the regression on total food consumption
and for each individual food consumption category. Both OLS estimates (using
actual PROCAMPO transfer values) and IV estimates are presented. The test
of overidentifying restrictions, as well as a Hausman exogeneity test is shown.
For each regression, Table 3 also includes results of the test of the hypothesis
that the PROCAMPO and PROGRESA coeﬃcients are equal. Only the estimates
corresponding to the transfer variables are presented in this table (full estimation
results are available from the authors upon request). The discussion is based
on the OLS results as long as the Hausman exogeneity test fails to reject that
PROCAMPO is exogenous, otherwise IV estimates are discussed; estimates that
apply in each case are presented in a bold font.
8 The Other Food groups includes: oil, sugar, coﬀee, cookies, soda, and alcohol.
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The estimate of the marginal propensity to consume food out of PROGRESA
is 0.31 and the corresponding estimate for PROCAMPO is 0.33. Both of these
estimates are diﬀerent from zero at one percent signiﬁcance level and are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. While indicating that the marginal impact
of the programs on food security is the same, the way in which food security is
achieved may be very diﬀerent between the programs.
The results for speciﬁc food groups indicate that the IV estimates are appropriate
for meat and other foods. The MPC for vegetables and fruits out of the two cash
transfers is small, though signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Transfers have a larger
impact on grain consumption, with a peso increase in either PROCAMPO or
PROGRESA triggering an increase in the consumption of grains between 0.12
and 0.15 pesos but in none of these cases we observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the two programs. On the other hand, tests of diﬀerence between PROCAMPO
and PROGRESA coeﬃcients indicate that the null hypothesis that they are
equal can be rejected for meat (3 percent signiﬁcance level) and other food (7
percent). The most noteworthy diﬀerence emerges when we evaluate the impact
on meat consumption. An additional peso of PROCAMPO would increase meat
consumption by 0.6 pesos, while a peso of PROGRESA generates an increase of
less than 0.1.
The estimates based on shares are presented in Table 4 and indicate that
PROGRESA recipients shift income towards vegetable and meat consumption
and away from grains and other food. This is a pattern displayed by most rural
households in developing countries as income increases. PROCAMPO has no
signiﬁcant impact on the vegetable or grains share but it shifts a large fraction
of income from the other food category towards meat and other animal products
and this shift is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from PROGRESA.
5.3. Caloric availability and calorie shares
Table 5 reports mean values of calorie consumption and calorie share by food
categories for all households and for the four recipient types. 9 Caloric availability
is constructed using conversion factors reported in Las Tablas de Valor Nutritivo
for Mexico (Chavas 1999). We estimate caloric availability based on household
averages, as this is how the data were reported. 10 The average nutrient intake
for the households in our sample is 2126 Kcal per person per day and the median
household is getting 1895 Kcal. The minimum dietary energy supply for Mexico is
set at 1890 Kcal per person per day and any intake below 1680 Kcal is considered
undernourishment; based on this we estimate that about 40 percent of our sample
9 We have excluded households reporting no food was consumed, or households with caloric availability
per person per day less than or equal to 875 kcal or greater or equal to 5000 kcal. WE also exclude
those who reported having a party, or that consumed more than 2000 kcal of oil or lard.
10 This might be misleading if the distribution of inputs among the individuals in the household is not
uniform. In this case, average household nutrient demand relations would not very useful to predict
what happens to nutrient intakes for a given member in the household if household income increases.
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is malnourished. PROGRESA recipients have, on average, 2.8 percent more calories
available per person per day than do households receiving PROCAMPO only.
The diﬀerence is particularly big for vegetable calories. PROGRESA households
consume on average 19 percent more calories from vegetables and 11 percent
more calories from meat and animal products than PROCAMPO recipients. Those
receiving both programs do not consume more calories on average than households
receiving only one program; these households are poorer than those receiving
PROGRESA only.
Grains provide cheap calories and so they weight more in the calorie share
(74 percent) than in the consumption share (51 percent). At the other extreme,
vegetable calories are the most expensive accounting for 2 percent of total caloric
availability and 15 percent of the food budget. The grain share of calories for
PROCAMPO households is nearly 4 percent higher than the corresponding share
for PROGRESA recipients. However calories from vegetables and meat account
for a much smaller fraction of caloric availability in PROCAMPO households.
These diﬀerences might be connected to these households’ dependence on home
production for example.
Table 6 summarizes the results for the estimation of total calories as well as
calories derived from each of the food categories. A peso from PROGRESA leads
to a unit increase in total calories per person per day in the household while a
PROCAMPO peso increases total caloric availability by 2.8. However the standard
errors of these estimates are quite high, so that they are only signiﬁcant at
the 10 percent level and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. As in food
consumption, statistical diﬀerences between the programs emerge when we explore
the impact on the individual food categories. PROCAMPO has a signiﬁcantly
larger impact on calories consumed from vegetables than PROGRESA; this result,
together with the result in Table 3 that the marginal eﬀects of PROCAMPO and
PROGRESA on vegetable expenditure are the same, suggest that PROGRESA
recipients are paying more for each additional calorie from vegetables. The opposite
is true for meat consumption: a peso from PROCAMPO has a larger impact on
meat expenditure than a peso from PROGRESA but no diﬀerences are found for
caloric intake. The F-test also rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the two
coeﬃcients for the other food category. PROCAMPO actually has a large and
negative impact on calories acquired from these foods, while PROGRESA leads
to more calorie consumption out of them. These results tend to suggest that the
programs lead to diﬀerent behavioral responses from beneﬁciaries.
How responsive are food expenditures and caloric availability with respect to
transfer increases? This question is relevant when we are interested in exploring
whether households display a taste for variety or whether there exists a so-called
tradeoﬀ between quality and quantity. We have estimated food and calorie
elasticities from income from each program using a double-log speciﬁcation (results
available from the authors upon request). The calorie elasticity with respect to
PROGRESA transfers is half as large as the corresponding food expenditure
elasticity while in the case of PROCAMPO the size of the calorie elasticity is
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70 percent the size of the food elasticity, indicating that PROGRESA recipients
are more likely to substitute quality for quantity. It is interesting to observe this
pattern even among relatively poor and food insecure households.
Table 7 presents estimates of the regressions on calorie shares; these suggest
that both programs contribute to increase the share of vegetables and meat in
total caloric intake, reducing the share of grains and other food. PROCAMPO
has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect and statistically diﬀerent from PROGRESA in
increasing the vegetable share and in reducing the other food share.
5.4. Diversity analysis
Earlier in the section we saw that PROCAMPO and PROGRESA increase the
value of food consumption. Now we focus on the possibility that this change comes
about because of the consumption of new foods not previously consumed. Table 8
displays the percentage of households not eating certain foods or food groups by
program status. These indicate that PROGRESA households are more likely to be
eating fruits and vegetables, dairy products, meat and ﬁsh, but also processed foods.
The probit (and IV-probit) regressions estimates presented in Table 9 suggest that
PROGRESA (but not PROCAMPO) increases the likelihood of eating vegetables
and fruits; on the other hand PROCAMPO has a large impact on the probability of
eating meat and ﬁsh and this is statistically diﬀerent from the eﬀect of PROGRESA
transfers.
We do not ﬁnd any evidence that supports that one program has a larger impact
than the other on the probability of eating more dairy products and processed
foods. All this suggests that the two programs are contributing to increased variety,
understood in this case as the likelihood of eating more foods not previously
consumed. Since it is widely recognized that poor nutritional status can be caused
not only by insuﬃcient intake of calories but also by a diet that is insuﬃciently
diverse, the observed shift can be considered beneﬁcial.
Table 10 shows the mean value of the total number of total foods consumed, the
number of diﬀerent types of food within each sub-group, and the means for the
diversity indices while Table 11 presents the results of regressions of the number of
food and the diversity indices on PROCAMPO, PROGRESA and our usual control
variables. The results indicate that both programs have a positive eﬀect on variety,
measured by the total number of foods consumed. However, there are no statistical
diﬀerences between the two programs. We expect the lectures on nutrition and
health given to PROGRESA beneﬁciaries to have a larger impact on diversity for
these cash transfer recipients but we do not ﬁnd any evidence of this in the data
(relative to PROCAMPO households). Regressions using other, less conventional
measures of diversity, represented by the Simpson index, the Shannon index and
the ROD index, conﬁrm that the programs contribute to increase variety.
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5.5. Calories from home production
Finally, we are interested in examining the mechanism through which
PROGRESA and PROCAMPO contribute to increased food security, whether it
is through home production or through purchases. Table 12 presents mean values
of the shares of calories consumed from home production. On average, 30 percent
of all calories consumed come from home produced food. PROCAMPO households
are very dependent on home production, in particular for grains. Over 52 percent
of all grain calories they consume come from home produced grains. Though not
shown in the table, it is noteworthy that most of home production consists of grains,
followed by vegetables.
Table 13 presents the results of the Heckman selection model estimated for
calories from home production. As mentioned earlier we implement a Heckman
selection model to deal with the fact that not all households consume out of home
production. We believe that consumption out of home production is related to land,
agriculture machinery, and cattle ownership, and thus these are the variables that
determine the selection equation. The usual control variables are included in the
regression equation.
Compared to estimates of program impact on total calories there are noticeable
diﬀerences in the size of program impact on domestic consumption. While the
coeﬃcient of PROCAMPO is approximately the same magnitude, the coeﬃcient
of PROGRESA is half as large as the one in the regression for total calories
(Table 6). Furthermore, we strongly reject the hypothesis that the impact of
the two programs is the same. These results suggest that PROCAMPO increases
food security essentially from calories achieved through home production while
PROGRESA recipients are not as dependent on home production and obtain their
caloric intake from market purchases and home production in equal proportions.
The condition of continued agriculture production that PROCAMPO payments
require thus appears to make a diﬀerence in the way transfer beneﬁciaries spend
their money. The possibility of using PROCAMPO as collateral against which to
borrow money makes recipients more likely to invest in home production and hence
derive their consumption from this source.
6. Conclusions and Discussion
There are 3 main conclusions of our analysis. First, we do not ﬁnd systematic
evidence that PROGRESA, targeted at women, has a larger overall impact
on food security outcomes relative to PROCAMPO, which is targeted at
predominantly male farmers. Rather, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences are found for total
food consumption and total caloric intake, and for some food categories such
as meat and vegetables PROCAMPO seems to have a larger eﬀect relative
to PROGRESA. Our results suggest that an intervention aimed at promoting
agricultural investment, that is, a cash transfer program linked to a productive
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asset (land) can have as large an impact on food security as a proper anti-poverty
program.
Second, our results show that there exists some substitution of quantity for
quality as cash transfers rise, reﬂected by the fact that food expenditure elasticities
are higher than calorie elasticities. This shift from high calorie to low calorie/better
tasting foods is a major policy concern in the development literature. The reported
estimates show that most of the observed substitution takes the form of increased
food variety, speciﬁcally for meat and vegetables. Since poor nutritional status
can be caused not only by insuﬃcient intake of calories but also by lack of diet
diversity, the observed shift can be considered beneﬁcial. Moreover, there is no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the impacts of the two programs on diet diversity.
Third, our analysis indicates that the mechanism for achieving food security is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the programs, a result that is not surprising given
the diﬀerence in program conditionality. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that PROCAMPO
recipients obtain almost all their caloric intake from food consumed out of home
production, while PROGRESA recipients are likely to increase food security equally
from the market and from home production.
While the overall impact of PROCAMPO and PROGRESA on food security
is the same, there are some diﬀerences in details regarding speciﬁc consumption
patterns, and the behavioral responses to the two programs are clearly diﬀerent
with subsequent implications for program design. Recall that the impact of
PROCAMPO is measured after 4 years when the medium term spill-over eﬀects
from production and investment have been at least partially obtained. The pathway
to achieving food security and thus ensuring household welfare for PROCAMPO
households is agricultural investment and home production, while in PROGRESA
it is through market consumption, and these diﬀering pathways are directly related
to program rules and conditionality. The key policy conclusion is that both a
production based (in the medium term) and a consumption based (in the short
term) poverty intervention can foster food security. The precise choice of program
design will thus depend on objectives beyond total food consumption and caloric
intake, such as consumption from speciﬁc food categories, long term investment in
productive capacity, and the degree of access to retail food markets.
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ALL Only Only Both None
Number of households 9841 4353 923 1880 2685
Fraction of total 100 44.23 9.38 19.1 27.28
Transfers per month 1998 (Nov. 1997 pesos) – Means
PROGRESA 26.3 41.2 0.0 42.4 0.0
PROCAMPO 3.7 0.0 14.6 12.3 0.0
Per capita food consumption 136.3 142.7 125.2 134.8 130.9
Household characteristics (1997) – Means
Household size 1.69 1.63 1.80 1.79 1.66
Age of household head 42.19 40.94 46.03 44.65 41.16
Head is male (share) 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.91
Head speaks indigenous language (share) 0.42 0.39 0.50 0.47 0.40
Share of kids 3-4 years old 9.51 10.22 7.23 8.09 10.14
Share of kids 4-9 years old 7.19 7.50 6.28 6.32 7.62
Share of kids 10-13 years old 19.58 19.45 19.72 19.83 19.58
Share of males 11-14 years old 5.59 4.93 6.92 7.01 5.21
Share of females 11-14 years old 5.20 4.70 6.42 5.87 5.14
Share of males 15-19 years old 4.20 3.99 5.17 4.91 3.70
Share of females 15-19 years old 4.50 4.35 4.88 4.91 4.32
Share of males 20-34 years old 9.89 10.99 6.81 7.82 10.61
Share of females 20-34 years old 10.78 11.22 8.98 9.14 11.83
Share of males 35-59 years old 8.31 7.60 10.07 9.65 7.90
Share of females 35-59 years old 8.00 7.50 9.46 9.15 7.52
Share of males 60+ years old 3.58 3.64 4.18 4.01 2.96
Share of females 60+ years old 3.49 3.67 3.76 3.23 3.28
Males with no education (share) 19.27 20.09 17.64 17.68 19.62
Females with no education (share) 21.92 22.25 20.65 20.09 23.13
Literate males (share) 19.86 19.24 21.13 21.64 19.17
Literate females (share) 17.55 17.22 18.1 18.21 17.42
Males with primary education (share) 8.84 8.79 9.43 9.55 8.23
Females with primary education (share) 8.52 8.35 9.06 8.72 8.47
Males with secondary education (share) 1.73 1.78 1.52 1.87 1.62
Females with secondary education (share) 1.53 1.50 1.71 1.52 1.54
Males with higher education (share) 0.22 0.26 0.16 0.18 0.18
Females with higher education (share) 0.15 0.19 0.09 0.08 0.15
Village mean non agricultural wage (Nov. 1997 pesos) 16.15 17.01 16.65 13.59 16.36
Village mean agricultural wage (Nov. 1997 pesos) 2.87 3.03 2.44 1.78 3.5
House has dirt floor (share) 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.76
House has piped water (share) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03
House has electricity (share) 0.60 0.57 0.65 0.62 0.61
Hectares of irrigated land 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.03
Hectares of non irrigated land 1.61 1.10 3.26 2.72 1.09
Hectares of pasture land 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.07
Hectares of forestry land 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02
Cows owned 0.61 0.43 1.16 1.00 0.46
Pigs owned 1.03 0.84 1.78 1.25 0.91
Price index 10.39 10.49 9.98 10.44 10.33
Region of residence – Shares
Sierra Negra-Zongolica-Mazateca 12.34 11.56 14.19 10.90 13.98
Sierra Norte-Otomi Tepehua 18.39 20.45 12.89 12.13 21.32
Sierra Gorda 42.92 41.28 45.61 45.16 43.09
Montana (Guerrero) 10.12 11.3 8.78 12.66 6.90
Huasteca (San Luis Potosi) 1.11 0.80 1.41 1.17 1.45
Tierra Caliente (Michoacan) 12.78 13.21 13.65 11.7 12.52
Altiplano (San Luis Potosi) 2.35 1.40 3.47 6.28 0.75
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Table 2
Mean value of food consumption and consumption shares
ALL PROGRESA PROCAMPO BOTH NONE
Level Share Level Share Level Share Level Share Level Share
Total food 136.3 142.7 125.2 134.8 130.9
Vegetables 21.5 15.4 22.5 15.6 20.2 14.7 21.7 15.7 20.1 15.0
Grains and cereals 65.9 51.0 68.3 50.4 60.7 52.9 64.2 49.9 65.0 52.2
Meat and animal products 25.6 16.5 27.5 17.0 23.5 15.5 26.6 17.6 22.5 15.1
Other food 22.9 17.1 24.0 17.1 20.3 16.9 22.0 16.8 22.6 17.6
Food consumption measured per person per month in 1997 pesos.
Table 3
Regression estimates for food consumption
All food Vegetables Grains Meat Other food
PROGRESA 0.307 0.064 0.117 0.085 0.037
(3.54) (4.26) (2.06) (3.19) (3.04)
PROCAMPO 0.332 0.071 0.145 0.117 0.019
(3.20) (2.69) (3.95) (1.87) (0.77)
R-squared 0.25 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.12
p-value for PROGRESA=PROCAMPO 0.85 0.81 0.6 0.69 0.48
Instrumental variable estimates
PROGRESA 0.321 0.065 0.126 0.087 0.039
(3.66) (4.30) (2.17) (3.16) (3.14)
PROCAMPO 0.683 0.142 0.119 0.652 −0.223
(1.29) (1.12) (0.49) (2.54) (1.59)
R-squared 0.25 0.1 0.13 0.1 0.11
p-value for PROGRESA=PROCAMPO 0.5 0.55 0.98 0.03 0.06
p-value for overid test 0.39 0.46 0.3 0.72 0.71
p-value for Hausman exogeneity test 0.47 0.56 0.9 0.02 0.07
Numbers shown are coeﬃcient estimates for peso amount of transfers of PROCAMPO
and PROGRESA received by household. Preferred estimates as implied by Hausman
test are in bold. T-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 4
Regression estimates for food consumption
Vegetables Grains Meat Other food
PROGRESA 0.014 −0.031 0.023 -0.007
(2.77) (2.91) (3.21) (1.23)
PROCAMPO 0.008 −0.021 0.04 −0.026
(0.84) (1.06) (2.68) (3.23)
R-squared 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.13
p-value for PROGRESA=PROCAMPO 0.49 0.65 0.31 0.03
Instrumental variable estimates
PROGRESA 0.015 −0.03 0.023 −0.008
(2.78) (2.79) (3.08) (1.42)
PROCAMPO 0.06 −0.084 0.259 −0.215
(1.04) (0.73) (2.92) (2.86)
R-squared 0.06 0.14 0.1 0.08
p-value for PROGRESA=PROCAMPO 0.43 0.64 0.01 0.01
p-value for overid test 0.37 0.46 0.99 0.39
p-value for Hausman exogeneity test 0.6 0.54 0 0
Numbers shown are coeﬃcient estimates for peso amount of transfers of
PROCAMPO and PROGRESA received by household. Preferred estimates
as implied by Hausman test are in bold. T-statistics in parenthesis.
Table 5
Mean value of caloric availability and calorie share by household type
ALL PROGRESA PROCAMPO BOTH NONE
Level Share Level Share Level Share Level Share Level Share
Total food 2126.4 2156.2 2095.7 2139.7 2079.4
Vegetable 42.7 2.1 45.0 2.2 37.8 1.9 45.4 2.3 38.8 2.0
Grains and cereals 1622.6 74.6 1633.7 74.0 1637.5 76.9 1640.0 75.1 1587.1 74.5
Meat and animal products 116.0 5.7 120.2 5.9 108.5 5.4 123.7 6.0 106.5 5.4
Other food 345.2 17.5 357.4 17.9 311.9 15.9 330.6 16.7 347.0 18.1
Calories are measured per person per day.
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Table 6
Regression estimates of calorie availability
All food Vegetables Grains Meat Other food
PROGRESA 1.054 0.114 0.521 0.178 0.241
(1.89) (4.83) (0.98) (2.31) (2.17)
PROCAMPO 2.802 0.125 1.688 0.498 0.491
(1.62) (2.38) (1.25) (1.70) (1.50)
R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.17 0.3
p-value for PROGRESA=PROCAMPO 0.33 0.85 0.42 0.3 0.46
Instrumental Variable Estimates
PROGRESA 1.064 0.120 0.535 0.196 0.224
(1.91) (4.91) (1.01) (2.45) (2.03)
PROCAMPO 4.033 0.597 4.143 2.281 −3.38
(0.63) (2.31) (0.70) (1.72) (2.23)
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.26
p-value for PROGRESA=PROCAMPO 0.64 0.07 0.54 0.10 0.02
p-value for overid test 0.30 0.72 0.33 0.41 0.55
p-value for Hausman exogeneity test 0.84 0.05 0.66 0.09 0.00
Numbers shown are coeﬃcient estimates for peso amount of transfers of
PROCAMPO and PROGRESA received by household. Preferred estimates as
implied by Hausman test are in bold. T-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 7
Regression estimates of calorie share
Vegetables Grains Meat Other food
PROGRESA 0.004 −0.01 0.005 0.000
(3.79) (1.46) (1.49) (0.06)
PROCAMPO 0.004 −0.014 0.011 −0.001
(2.09) (1.19) (1.44) (0.08)
R-squared 0.09 0.16 0.17 0.12
p-value for PROGRESA=PROCAMPO 0.74 0.78 0.52 0.91
Instrumental Variable Estimates
PROGRESA 0.005 -0.01 0.006 −0.001
(3.80) (1.40) (1.66) (0.12)
PROCAMPO 0.031 0.083 0.086 −0.234
(2.33) (1.08) (1.47) (2.61)
R-squared 0.07 0.15 0.15 0.05
p-value for PROGRESA=PROCAMPO 0.05 0.22 0.17 0.01
p-value for overid test 0.86 0.43 0.23 0.16
p-value for Hausman exogeneity test 0.09 0.16 0.14 0.00
Numbers shown are coeﬃcient estimates for peso amount of transfers of
PROCAMPO and PROGRESA received by household. Preferred estimates
as implied by Hausman test are in bold. T-statistics in parenthesis.
Table 8
Percentage of households not consuming each food type
ALL PROGRESA PROCAMPO BOTH NONE
Fruits and vegetables 20 18 27 19 23
Meat and ﬁsh 50 48 53 43 58
Dairy products 14 12 19 11 18
Processed food 19 17 23 17 22
Tortillas 10 9 11 9 10
Chicken 60 58 61 54 67
Rice 37 37 38 34 40
Beans 3 3 4 3 3
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Table 9
Probit estimates of probability of purchasing food types
Meat and Processed
Vegetables ﬁsh Dairy foods
PROGRESA 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
(3.48) (4.60) (2.32) (2.97)
[.001] [.001] [.001] [.001]
PROCAMPO −0.00 0.005 0.003 0.002
(0.17) (2.31) (1.54) (1.11)
[−.000] [.002] [.001] [.000]
p-value for PROGRESA=PROCAMPO 0.03 0.52 0.69 0.69
Instrumental Variable Probit Estimates
Meat and Processed
Vegetables ﬁsh Dairy foods
PROGRESA 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
(5.47) (6.95) (4.27) (4.29)
PROCAMPO 0.006 0.03 0.01 0.00
(0.89) (4.81) (1.34) (0.07)
p-value for PROGRESA=PROCAMPO 0.67 0.00 0.31 0.67
p-value for Smith-Blundell test 0.35 0.00 0.36 0.73
Vegetables exclude tomatoes and onions; Dairy includes milk, eggs and cheese;
processed foods include white bread, sweet bread, loaf bread, noodles, crackers,
breakfast cereals, cookies, coﬀee and soft drinks. Numbers shown are coeﬃcient
estimates for peso amount of transfers of PROCAMPO and PROGRESA
received by household derived from probit regressions. Preferred estimates
as regressions. Preferred estimates as implied by Smith-Blundell test are
in bold. Z-statistics in parenthesis. Marginal eﬀects in square brackets
(only for non instrumental variable estimates).
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Table 10
Mean values for diversity analysis
ALL PROGRESA PROCAMPO BOTH NONE
Number of foods (max=36) 12.7 12.9 12.3 13.4 12.1
Number of vegetables (max=10) 3.7 3.8 3.5 4.0 3.5
Number of grains and cereals (max=11) 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.5 4.2
Number of animal products (max=9) 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.2 1.8
Number of other foods (max=6) 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6
Number of processed foods (max=8) 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.4
Simpson index 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
Shannon index 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5
ROD index 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9
See text for deﬁnition of indexes.
Table 11
Regression estimates for diet diversity
No. of foods Simpson index Shannon index ROD index
PROGRESA 0.012 0.02 0.079 0.014
(4.37) (2.43) (3.34) (2.39)
PROCAMPO 0.017 0.022 0.112 0.009
(4.04) (1.89) (3.53) (1.07)
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.07
p-value for PROGRESA=PROCAMPO 0.27 0.89 0.42 0.63
Instrumental Variable Estimates
PROGRESA 0.012 0.02 0.08 0.014
(4.40) (2.45) (3.37) (2.43)
PROCAMPO 0.06 0.036 0.343 0.11
(1.81) (0.37) (1.17) (1.62)
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.05
p-value for PROGRESA=PROCAMPO 0.15 0.87 0.37 0.16
p-value for overid test 0.76 0.53 0.77 0.58
p-value for Hausman exogeneity test 0.17 0.88 0.39 0.1
Numbers shown are coeﬃcient estimates for peso amount of transfers of PROCAMPO and
PROGRESA received by household. Preferred estimates as implied by Hausman test are
in bold. T-statistics in parenthesis. See text for deﬁnition of indexes.
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Table 12
Caloric availability from home production
PERCENTAGE ALL PROGRESA PROCAMPO BOTH NONE
Total food 30 27 42 40 25
Vegetables 15 14 16 16 15
Grains and cereals 39 35 52 51 31
Meat and animal products 10 10 12 12 9
Other food 0 0 0 0 0
Shares are out of total calories.
Table 13






p-value for PROGRESA=PROCAMPO 0 0.44
Rho 0.249 −0.945
(5.25) (77.65)
p-value for likelihood ratio test rho=0 0.00 0.00
Numbers shown are coeﬃcient estimates for peso amount of transfers of
PROCAMPO and PROGRESA received by household derived from selectivity
corrected maximum likelihood. Z-statistics in parenthesis.
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